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NOTES
The Louisiana courts of appeal, apparently reluctant to impose
tort liability on the partner in addition to compensation liability on
the partnership, have molded a rule that the partner is not a third
party under the Workmen's Compensation Act unless he is an em-
ployee of the partnership. Such a rule cannot be reconciled with the
Louisiana entity theory of partnership under which an employee is
properly employed by the partnership entity rather than the partner.
The partner is a third party regardless of any employee status he
might have with the partnership, and the employer's immunity under
the Workmen's Compensation Act should properly attach to the part-
nership rather than the partner. By changing their positions in Leger,
Cockerham and Bersuder, the courts could remain faithful to the
entity theory by holding that the partner, like the corporate officer,
is a third party. Since the overruling of Peterson, the partner and the
corporate officer may not be distinguished by the mere fact that the
primary obligation of the partnership is also the secondary obligation
of the partner.
Randy J. McClanahan
NONRESIDENT TUITION: CHIPPING AWAY AT THE BLOCKADE
In Vlandis v. Kline,' two University of Connecticut students
challenged a Connecticut statute2 that irreversibly classified them as
nonresidents for the entire period of their attendance at the univer-
sity. Claiming that they were bona fide residents of Connecticut, the
students argued that the state's statutory definition of residence for
tuition purposes violated their constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection. The United States District Court held the stat-
ute invalid and granted injunctive relief.3 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the due process clause
forbids classification based on:
presented must be maintained as resulting from our peculiar law, though it would be
true in no other state of the Union. Elsewhere the partners are always individually
liable, and the partnership as a distinct being cannot be cited. In Louisiana, during
the existence of a commercial partnership, it alone can be sued for a partnership debt,
and the citation may be served upon the firm by service upon the partner." Liverpool,
Brazil & River Platte Nay. Co. v. Agar & Lelong, 14 F. 615 (Circuit Court, E.D. La.
1882).
1. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-329b, as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 126
(1971).
3. Kline v. Vlandis, 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972).
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a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence,
when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in
fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of
making the crucial determination.4
Nonresidents who attend state-supported universities are gener-
ally required to pay tuition and fees at a higher rate than residents.
In recent years this differential tuition scheme has been challenged
on several occasions.5 The courts have consistently held that a state
may discriminate between properly classified resident and nonresi-
dent students,6 on the ground that the differential scheme protects
the legitimate state purpose of financing higher educational facili-
ties.7 The argument is that, unlike residents, nonresidents have not
contributed to the state's economy in the past through the payment
of taxes and are likely to leave after graduation.8 Hence, the higher
tuition requirement is characterized as a valid attempt to equalize
the cost of education between the two classes. The Kline decision
does not alter the right of the state to condition the benefit of a largely
subsidized education on the basis of residency.' Although this specific
issue was not before the Court in Kline, Justice Stewart remarked
we fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities
and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institu-
tions on a preferential tuition basis. 0
Despite the Court's summary treatment of the issue, even the
admitted nonresident is not wholly without constitutional arguments
4. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Arizona Board of Regents v. Harper, 108 Ariz. 223, 495 P.2d 453
(1972); Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
6. See, e,g., Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom.,
Twist v. Redeker, 396 U.S. 853 (1969); Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F.Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa
1966), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 862 (1969); Arizona Board of Regents v. Harper, 108 Ariz.
223, 495 P.2d 453 (1972); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr.
260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); Landwehr v. Regents of Univ. of
Colorado, 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964); Thompson v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb.
252, 188 N.W.2d 840 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D. Minn. 1970); Clarke
v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
8. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 240-41 (D. Minn. 1970).
9. In statutes and regulations dealing with nonresident tuition the terms "resi-
dence" and "domicile" are often used synonymously. Generally a person's domicile is
"that place where he has his true, fixed, and permanent home and principal establish-
ment, and to which he has the intention of returning whenever he is absent therefrom."
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 26, at 86 (2d ed. 1970).
10. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-53 (1973).
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to base his claim against the validity of residency requirements. The
interstate privileges and immunities clause," the commerce clause,"
and the right to travel 3 have all been invoked by nonresidents. How-
ever, in each instance the courts have upheld the differential scheme
as bearing a rational relationship to the state's proposed goal of cost
equalization."
Although the courts have upheld the right of the states to charge
discriminatory fees to a properly classified nonresident, the question
arises as to what constitutes proper classification. Many states im-
pose a waiting period, usually of one year, which must be met before
a student may be classified as a resident.' 5 This requirement is dis-
tinct from that of residency alone since it operates to deny to new
residents as well as nonresidents the benefits of a subsidized educa-
tion. The Court in Kline cautioned that the decision should not "be
construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student . . .a
reasonable durational requirement which can be met while in student
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See, e.g., Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App.
2d 430, 444-45, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (1969).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See, e.g., Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117' 123 n.7
(S.D. Iowa 1966).
13. Although the right to travel from one state to another is no longer disputed,
the source of that right has not been ascribed to a particular constitutional provision.
Nevertheless, since the Court has deemed the right to be fundamental, any classifica-
tion which penalizes the exercise of that right must be invalidated under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment unless such classification is necessary
to promote a compelling state interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31,
634 (1969). Hence, the nonresident student must show that the higher tuition has
produced such dire effects as to warrant its classification as a penalty on his right to
travel, before the courts will feel bound to employ the strict-scrutiny, compelling
interest test when analyzing the state provisions. However, the courts have chosen to
regard nonresident tuition as something less than a penalty on interstate travel, and
insist that it is not an infringement of a fundamental right. See Starns v. Malkerson,
326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970); Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d
430, 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-67 (1969).
14. But see Clarke, Validity of Discriminatory Nonresident Tuition Charges in
Public Higher Education under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause, 50
NEB. L. REV. 31, 34-35 (1971) for the proposition that the state's purported goal of cost
equalization is not furthered by the discriminatory rate. Clarke argues that many
states maintain surplus educational facilities and that the marginal cost of educating
nonresidents who fill these excess places may well be below the amount of tuition
collected from them. Hence, rather than serving to equalize costs, nonresident tuition
"requires nonresidents to pay more of the fixed costs of governmental benefits so
residents can receive the same benefits at a smaller charge."
15. See, e.g., the Minnesota requirement in Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp.
234, 235-36 (D. Minn. 1970) and California's requirement in Kirk v. Board of Regents,
273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 433, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 262 (1969).
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status."'" The Court proceeded to cite with approval'7 its affirmance
of Starns v. Malkerson, ,8 a three judge district court opinion that
upheld a Minnesota one year irrebuttable requirement. Hence, al-
though the Court in Kline invalidated Connecticut's irrebuttable pre-
sumption, it nevertheless allowed Minnesota's incontestable pre-
sumption to stand. Of course, the distinction may be made that the
presumption in Kline was permanent, while the presumption in
Starns continued for only one year. However, as pointed out by Jus-
tice Rehnquist's dissent, "one may read the Court's opinion in vain
to ascertain why it is a difference of constitutional significance."' 9
The Court's rationale for approving the durational residency re-
quirement in Starns was that such a requirement could be regarded
by the State as one indispensable element of proof of domicilliary
intent.20 Although the length of time a student has resided in the state
is certainly a method of ascertaining his intention to become a resi-
dent, the Court gave no reason why such a requirement should be
considered by the state as indispensable. There are other practicable
methods of demonstrating the requisite intention that will ensure
that all bona fide residents are treated equally.2 ' Instead of providing
a workable guideline for states in their determination of a student's
status, the irrebuttable waiting period merely postpones the time
when the appropriate classifying body must assess the facts of a
particular case to the detriment of those students who were indeed
residents from the moment they entered the state. Moreover, if the
waiting period is not considered a means of testing domicilliary in-
tent, it could only operate to differentiate between old and new resi-
dents. Although a state may condition the benefits of a subsidized
education on the basis of residency, it may not limit these benefits
solely to old or established residents. The United States Supreme
Court has held that under both the minimum and compelling interest
standards of review, the equal protection clause forbids the appor-
tioning of state services among residents based on past tax contribu-
tions.212 Hence, if the Court's rationale for upholding the irrebuttable
16. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
17. Id. at 452-53 n.9.
18. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mer, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
19. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 467 (1973).
20. Id. at 452-53 n.9.
21. See the criteria suggested by the Attorney General of Connecticut which in-
clude voter registration, property ownership, etc. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454
(1973).
22. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 450 n.6 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
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requirement of Starns is rejected, the conclusion that such a require-
ment violates the equal protection clause seems inescapable.3
The Kline decision did not have the effect of validating every
irrebuttable presumption, however. A distinction must be drawn be-
tween those waiting period requirements which may be met while a
student is attending school and those which may only be met exclu-
sive of school attendance. Kline approved only the former. The latter
requirement24 forces a student to either drop out of school for the
requisite period or be classified as a nonresident for the entire time
he attends school. The effect of such a requirement is to create a
permanent presumption of nonresidence for all those persons who do
not choose to interrupt their education5 Furthermore, there is no
rational basis for requiring that an individual be denied the right to
prove his resident status simply because he is a student. 6 However,
only those waiting periods that create a conclusive presumption of
nonresidency for the entire period of school attendance are forbidden
by Kline. Kline does not prevent a university from initially classify-
ing a student as a nonresident as long as that student is given the
right at some reasonable future time to controvert such a presump-
tion of nonresidence by presenting evidence of his intention to remain
in the state. A state is only prohibited from using an irrebuttable
durational requirement, which cannot be met while a student, as a
device to create a permanent presumption of nonresidence.
Finally, once a student has resided in the state for the required
waiting period, a determination must then be made concerning his
true residency status. Many states provide that a student is pre-
sumed to be a nonresident if he moves into the state with the primary
23. "I now have serious question as to the validity of that summary decision
[Starns v. Malkersoni in light of well-established principles, under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which limit the States' ability to set resi-
dency requirements for the receipt of rights and benefits bestowed on bona fide resi-
dents." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973) (concurring opinion).
24. See, e.g., the tuition regulations of the University of North Carolina which
require that a student maintain his domicile in North Carolina for six continuous
months exclusive of any time spent in attendance at any institution of higher educa-
tion. Glusman v. Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina, 281 N.C. 629, 190 S.E.2d
213 (1972).
25. See Covell v. Douglas, 501 P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 952
(1973) (declaring such requirements unconstitutional). See also Glusman v. Trustees
of the Univ. of North Carolina, 281 N.C. 629, 190 S.E.2d 213 (1972), vacated, 412 U.S.
947 (1973).
26. Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (which struck down a Texas resi-
dence requirement for voting which prevented a serviceman from voting in Texas
unless he resided there at the time of entry into the service).
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purpose of attending school.27 This presumption is strengthened by
the inference that a student originally from out of state who is attend-
ing school in state, moved there primarily for the purpose of attend-
ing school. This presumption is not entirely correct. Even if a person's
primary motivation for moving is to acquire an education, it is still
possible that he intends to make his new habitat his permanent resi-
dence' However, the Kline decision does not forbid the state from
making its initial determination on this basis.28 Such an initial deter-
mination merely narrows down the class of students who may eventu-
ally be properly classified as nonresidents. However, Kline does make
it clear that at least after residing in the state for one year, a student
has the right to present evidence that he is a bona fide resident of that
state. " In so doing, the Court approved the Attorney General of Con-
necticut's standard for determining the residential status of a stu-
dent, stating
[e]ach individual case must be decided on its own particular
facts. In reviewing a claim, relevant criteria include year-round
residence, voter registration, place of filing tax returns, property
ownership, driver's license, car registration, marital status, vaca-
tion employment, etc.3 0
In applying such a standard, the lower courts have held that an
appellate review committee may properly place the burden of proof
on a student to present by clear and convincing evidence that he is a
bona fide resident.2 ' However, the student's statement of intent and
the evidence he adduces to support it should not be brushed aside as
a self-serving attempt to controvert the law. Moreover, each student
who is classified as a nonresident should be informed of the proce-
dural remedies afforded him to change his classification. 2 Despite the
administrative burden, expense and uncertainty that arises from af-
fording each student a full review on his case for residency, the due
process clause allows no less.
The Kline decision does not have the effect of invalidating the
regulations involving residency classification at Louisiana State Uni-
versity. 3  Like most state-supported schools, LSU charges its students
27. LSU GENERAL CATALOGUE 17 (1973).
28. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 454.
31. Arizona Board of Regents v. Harper, 108 Ariz. 223, 229, 495 P.2d 453, 459
(1972).
32. Id.
33. Regulations are set out in Presidential Memorandum 31, (May 15, 1972)
(unpublished).
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who are classified as nonresidents an additional fee above that as-
sessed to residents.34 The residency regulations stipulate that a stu-
dent will be classified as a nonresident unless his parents are Louis-
iana residents" or the student has resided in Louisiana for a year
exclusive of time spent in full time study at the university.3 6 Excep-
tions are provided for former residents of Louisiana,37 persons serving
in the Armed Forces, 8 and full time employees of the university. 9 A
student who is unable to fit into one of these exceptions and who has
therefore been classified as a nonresident has the right to appeal his
classification to two appellate committees. 0 The final appellate body
has the authority to use its discretion in determining the status of the
student and may deviate from the guidelines in the regulations. Be-
cause the conditions for attaining resident status are merely rebutta-
ble presumptions, the LSU regulations are not on their face unconsti-
tutional. Most importantly, the final appellate body has the right to
reclassify a student "if all of the circumstances in his case show
strongly and convincingly that the student is a bona fide resident of
the state."4 ' However, the administration of such guidelines must
comply with the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. As the
lower courts have recognized, administrative review bodies may
abuse their discretion if they allow rebuttable presumptions to be-
come hard and fast rules in their application."
The dictates of the Kline decision mean that it will become
administratively more difficult to continue the present differential
scheme. Because of the increased cost of providing the constitution-
ally required review, it is possible that such increased costs may offset
any additional revenues received from the higher nonresident tuition.
One possible solution to this dilemma has been implemented by Min-
nesota and Wisconsin which have recently entered into a reciprocal
agreement whereby each state will admit the other state's students
at in-state rates. However, the better solution would be to end the
discriminatory rates entirely, an option that is now left to the legisla-
34. LSU GENERAL CATALOGUE 24 (1973), states that the nonresident fee per semes-
ter for full time undergraduate students is $315.00.
35. Presidential Memorandum 31 at 2 (May 15, 1972) (unpublished).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id.
42. See Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 125 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (The court
reclassified a student as a resident claiming that the application of the regulations by
the Review Committee was unduly rigid.)
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ture. Justice Hay in Arizona Board of Regents v. Harper3 best ex-
presses the need for such a new approach.
It must be recognized that the nonresident students bring to the
campus a pollinating effect in the form of new ideas from other
parts of the country and the world. They prevent sterility and
provincialism in local thinking. The schools with the most cosmo-
politan student bodies are among those most highly regarded in
America today. A school which prohibits the enrollment of non-
residents is doomed to mediocrity. 4
Martha Salvant
THE REQUIREMENT OF A DEFINITE TIME PERIOD IN OPTION CONTRACTS
Louisiana courts have, on several occasions, held that options to
purchase which do not contain definite time periods for the life of the
options are invalid.' The reason given, in the cases so holding, is that
an option with no limit on its duration could hold the affected prop-
erty out of commerce perpetually if the option were never exercised.
The most recent example of this is the case of Delcambre v. Dubois,2
in which the plaintiff sued for specific performance of an unrecorded
counterletter granting him the right to repurchase his interest in
certain lands sold to defendant co-owners. The court, on original
hearing,3 found that the counterletter was an option, invalid for lack
of a definite time period:
Our jurisprudence establishes a public policy in this state against
holding property out of commerce. . . . The . . . option, which
43. 108 Ariz. 223, 495 P.2d 453 (1972).
44. Id. at 228, 495 P.2d at 458.
1. Williams v. McCormick, 139 La. 319, 71 So. 523 (1916); Parrott v. McCormick,
139 La. 318, 71 So. 523 (1916); Nervis v. McCormick, 139 La. 318, 71 So. 523 (1916);
Dunham v. McCormick, 139 La. 317, 71 So. 523 (1916); Calhoun v. Christine Oil &
Gas Co., 139 La. 316, 71 So. 522 (1916); Bristo v. Christine Oil & Gas Co., 139 La. 312,
71 So. 521 (1916); Delcambre v. Dubois, 263 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Clark
v. Dixon, 254 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
2. 263 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
3. On rehearing, the court, apparently conceding the conclusions of law drawn on
original hearing, found the counterletter to be a reservation of the right of repurchase,
which is not invalid for the lack of definite time period, but rather is reducible to the
statutory maximum of 10 years provided in article 2568.
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